Confronting Crawford: Judicial Historiography and the Sixth Amendment by Young, Randall
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 1 Article 5 
Fall 2017 
Confronting Crawford: Judicial Historiography and the Sixth 
Amendment 
Randall Young 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Randall Young, Confronting Crawford: Judicial Historiography and the Sixth Amendment, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 
121 (2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss1/5 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
 121 
CONFRONTING CRAWFORD: JUDICIAL 
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
I. BACKGROUND: CONFRONTATION, CRAWFORD, AND THE TESTIMONIAL DICHOTOMY 
Professor John H. Wigmore wrote that common law’s right of confrontation served 
primarily two purposes: to secure for the opponent the right of cross-examination, and to 
enable “the judge and jury . . . to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a 
witness’ deportment while testifying,” where “a certain subjective moral effect is produced 
upon the witness.”1 Justice Scalia confirms this through his introduction to discussion of 
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause in Coy v. Iowa.2 Citing to ancient sources 
of law, American common law, and even the etymology of the word “confrontation,” 
Scalia generates the same rationale as that of the Court’s plurality opinion in Pennsylvania 
v. Ritchie, that “[t]he Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal 
defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to con-
duct cross-examination.”3 
Initially, the decision explicated in Crawford v. Washington seems in accordance 
with the general aims of confrontation as articulated in previous cases. Writing for the 
Court, Scalia articulated the rule of Crawford, being that out-of-court statements which 
qualify as testimonial are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause, unless the wit-
ness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine the witness.4 
In doing so, Scalia expressed a historical statement as much as one of law: that the princi-
pal evil for which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law model of crim-
inal procedure which allowed ex-parte examinations to be admitted into evidence against 
the accused.5 This statement is as much a historical statement as it is a legal determination 
in that there is a necessary codependent relationship between the Court’s legal rationale 
and its historiography of criminal procedure. Thus, to properly understand the legal con-
clusions made in Crawford, and the legal rationales which animated them, it is critical to 
recognize the Court’s historiographic analysis. 
Crawford and nearly a decade of its progeny were followed by Williams v. Illinois, 
which held that when a court seeks to identify the primary purpose of an out-of-court 
statement, in determining whether it is testimonial or not and therefore implicates the Con-
frontation Clause, it must apply an objective test; that court looks to the primary purpose 
to which a reasonable person would have ascribed such a statement.6 In doing so, the Court 
                                                 
 1. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1395, at 94–96 (2d ed. 1923).   
 2. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
 3. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)). 
 4. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 5. Id. at 50. 
 6. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 83 (2012). 
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held that an expert’s testimony referring to a DNA profile as having been produced from 
semen found on the victim did not violate the Confrontation Clause.7 This decision engen-
dered a peculiar joining of minds for the dissent: Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and So-
tomayor, joined with Scalia in opposition to the decision offered by the plurality.8 In a 
detailed, nuanced dissent, Justice Kagan articulated how the plurality’s decision was di-
rectly inapposite to Crawford and its progeny.9 The difficulty of the case centered on the 
question of what was “testimonial’ for the purposes of the U.S. Constitution’s Confronta-
tion Clause. 
The purpose of this Comment is to address the question of whether the Court, in 
Crawford and Williams, actually performed the correct inquiry. The testimonial/nontesti-
monial dichotomy as articulated by the Crawford Court was deeply informed, influenced, 
and directly responsive to the historical analysis proffered by Scalia, writing for the Court. 
Where the historiographic survey and analysis conducted by the Court animated the legal 
conclusions and rationales of the Crawford decision, the outcome of Williams v. Illinois 
entreats further exploration into Crawford’s historical outlook. Therefore, this Comment 
seeks to examine the Crawford Court’s historiography in detail, and determine whether or 
not this research adequately comes to terms with the core principles which animate the 
right of confrontation in common law jurisprudence. When historical sources are given 
their fullest treatment, it becomes clear that the Crawford Court’s erroneous historio-
graphic analysis set an improper standard which, in turn, set the stage for the arguably 
confused, but without a doubt widely conflicting opinions found in Williams v. Illinois. 
The facts before the Court in Crawford v. Washington were clear: On August 5, 
1999, Kenneth Lee was stabbed in his apartment, and later that same night, the police 
arrested the petitioner, William Crawford.10 When William Crawford and his wife, Sylvia 
Crawford, were each interrogated twice, the petitioner ultimately confessed that the two 
had went out to search for the decedent, saying that Kenneth Lee had earlier tried to rape 
Sylvia.11 What was of relevance, the true reason behind why this case had come before the 
United States Supreme Court, were divergent statements made by William Crawford and 
Sylvia Crawford; while Sylvia on the whole corroborated the story told by William, her 
account of the altercation between William and Kenneth Lee was particularly different 
with regard to whether the decedent had drawn a weapon before William Crawford as-
saulted him.12 Whereas William Crawford told the investigators that he could possibly 
remember the decedent “reachin’, fiddlin’ around” for a weapon, Sylvia replied that she 
had not actually seen anything in Kenneth Lee’s hands when the fight began.13 
On these facts, resting primarily on Sylvia’s conflicting statement that Kenneth Lee 
was apparently unarmed at the time of his death, the State charged William Crawford with 
assault and attempted murder, to which he claimed self-defense.14 Since Washington’s law 
of marital privilege bars a spouse from testifying against the other without consent, Sylvia 
                                                 
 7. Id. at 50. 
 8. Id. at 63. 
 9. Id. at 64–76. 
 10. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 39.  
 13. Id. at 39–40. 
 14. Id. at 40. 
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did not testify.15 Without Sylvia Crawford to testify in court, the State sought to introduce 
her statements which had been recorded by the police in order to prove that William Craw-
ford had not acted in self-defense.16 The statements made to investigators were admitted 
under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, since Syliva herself had 
admitted to leading William Crawford to Kenneth Lee’s apartment—therefore facilitating 
the assault.17 
To the admission of Sylvia’s statements, William Crawford countered that admis-
sion of the statements “would violate his federal constitutional right to be ‘confronted with 
the witness against him.’”18 The trial court approached the question through the lens of 
Ohio v. Roberts, which “does not bar the admission of unavailable witness’s statements 
against a criminal defendant if that statement bears an ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’”19 
This exception allows admission of evidence which is either a “firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception,” or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”20 The trial court believed 
Sylvia’s statements to fall in the second category, finding a number of reasons to charac-
terize them as trustworthy.21 The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, and the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in turn reinstated the conviction, both of which applied similar 
methodologies of determining the trustworthiness of the statements.22 
The Court’s analysis in Crawford could have pursued a number of avenues of in-
quiry in addressing the question at bar, whether the State’s introduction of Sylvia’s state-
ment into evidence at trial violated the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In-
deed, Justice Scalia noted the diversity of approaches which could be utilized in analyzing 
the question. Always the Formalist, Scalia begins by noting that “[t]he Constitution’s text 
does not alone resolve this case. One could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant 
to mean those who actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at trial, or 
something in-between.”23 
Clearly alert to the varying constructions of confrontation, Scalia then simply con-
cludes “[w]e must therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand 
its meaning.”24 Scalia’s “therefore” does not signal that the Court would approach these 
varying constructions of confrontation in light of a historical analysis, but rather Scalia 
seems to mean that the Court dismisses—if not entirely forecloses—the independent ra-
tionales which animate alternative constructions. Scalia devotes very little energy with 
reference to these alternative constructions once he has begun his own historical analysis, 
save to address the challenges posed by the historiographic statements expressed by Wig-
more in his discussion of confrontation and the law of hearsay. 
This approach presents something of a quandary for anyone reading the Court’s 
opinion in Crawford: while being made aware of what appears to be a formidable body of 
                                                 
 15. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994) (cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40). 
 16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
 17. Wash. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (2003) (cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40). 
 19. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40). 
 20. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
 22. Id. at 41. 
 23. Id. at 42–43 (citations omitted).  
 24. Id. at 43. 
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independent bases of analysis, they are, in a sense, entirely foreclosed from further con-
sideration by the Court. The Court’s approach therefore necessarily relies with a nearly 
complete exclusivity on its own historical analysis. This in turn means that any appraisal 
of the decision’s efficacy necessarily requires a proper appraisal of the Court’s historical 
analysis. It is only by “checking” the historiography offered by the Court, as articulated 
by Justice Scalia, can the validity of analysis be properly assessed. The Court begins upon 
the foundation that “[t]he Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the reliabil-
ity of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state courts, lack authority to 
replace it with one of our own devising.”25 Now, it is worth noting that in the face of such 
a solemn assertion, Scalia himself writes in the very same opinion that the Constitution’s 
language alone is of little help to discern the purpose and procedure required by the Sixth 
Amendment.26 With no guidance from the language of the Constitution itself, but through 
a survey of Western jurisprudence, Scalia and the Court held that “the principal evil at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal proce-
dure, particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence.”27 Emblematic of this “prin-
cipal evil” is the sort of procedure evinced by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, from which 
the Framers sought to guard against in protecting the accused in “politically charged cases 
like Raleigh’s—great state trials where the impartiality of even those at the highest levels 
of the judiciary might not be so clear.”28 
The Court’s opinion is startlingly narrow in a sense, for it not only forcefully rejects 
the “open-ended” analysis developed in Ohio v. Roberts, but it also apparently rejects the 
notion that the Confrontation Clause “applies of its own force only to in-court testimony, 
and that its ‘application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends on the law 
of the Evidence for the time being.’”29 The Court’s rejection of the latter, admittedly more 
malleable, approach is problematic; Wigmore, in discussing the interrelationship between 
confrontation and hearsay, more than adequately accounts for the constitutional implica-
tions of an evolving law of hearsay: 
Now, the Hearsay rule is not a rule without exceptions; there was never a time when 
it was without exceptions. There were a number of well-established ones at the time 
of the earliest constitutions, and others might be expected to develop in the future. 
The rule had always involved the idea of exceptions, and the constitution-makers 
indorsed the general principle merely as such. They did not care to enumerate ex-
ceptions; they merely named and described the principle sufficiently to indicate 
what was intended. . . . The rule sanctioned by the Constitution is the Hearsay rule 
as to cross-examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found, 
developed, or created herein.30 
There is no indication whatsoever that Wigmore shared the Court’s concerns that 
such an approach would give rise to an alarming future jurisprudence envisioned by Scalia 
that “would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant 
                                                 
 25. Id. at 67.  
 26. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
 27. Id. at 50.  
 28. Id. at 68. 
 29. Id. at 50–51 (citing WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1397, at 101). 
 30. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1397, at 101.   
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inquisitorial practices.”31 Rather, convinced that such an approach would lead to a break-
down of constitutional protections, the Court embraced an analytical framework that ap-
pears as divorced from the aims of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause as does 
the reliability test developed in Ohio v. Roberts: whatever qualifies as testimonial falls 
under the protections guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause, subject to the existing ex-
ceptions to the rule of hearsay at the time the Framers wrote the Constitution.32 Perplex-
ingly, in fashioning such an analytical framework, the Court in Crawford abstains from 
further elucidating on this point, simply stating that it “leave[s] for another day any effort 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”33 Moreover, Scalia writes with-
out any consciousness to the profound implications posed by this analysis in an increas-
ingly Orwellian world, by stating that “[t]his focus” on a testimonial consideration read in 
light of the Raleigh case “suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s 
core concerns[,]” that even “[a]n off-hand, overheard remark . . . bears little resemblance 
to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.”34 Essentially, in embracing this 
analytical framework that treats whether statements are testimonial or not as the threshold 
inquiry, the Court—fearing a species of abuses secluded to politically charged show tri-
als—gives a free pass to statements which somehow pass as nontestimonial. That, how-
ever, is a question for another time.  
As this Comment will discuss, the Court’s approach lays the groundwork for prac-
tices which may contravene the broader principles of the Sixth Amendment’s Confronta-
tion Clause in resting upon a testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy as a product of its im-
precise historiography of confrontation. So, the guiding inquiry for this Comment focuses 
on whether or not the principles of confrontation in the history of criminal procedure hold 
true to the testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy as a permissible threshold question in 
Confrontation Clause analysis. 
II. ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL SOURCES OF CONFRONTATION: FOUNDATIONAL 
PRINCIPLES, OR DEAD END? 
A. Origins of Confrontation in the Ancient World 
Scalia writes, “[t]he right to confront one’s accusers is a concept that dates back to 
Roman times.”35 Naturally, the question begs to be asked: what exactly is the point of such 
a reference? Scalia does not devote much more than a passing reference to the ancient and 
medieval right of confrontation in Crawford. However, writing for the Court in Coy v. 
Iowa, Scalia dedicates enough information in the opinion to better understand the rele-
vance of ancient traditions with regard to confrontation.36 Justice Scalia writes that the 
very language of the Confrontation Clause comes “with a lineage that traces back to the 
beginnings of Western legal culture.”37 Indeed, when mentioning Roman law’s approach 
to confrontation, he quotes the famous verses of Acts 25:16, where the Roman governor 
                                                 
 31. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 68. 
 34. Id. at 51. 
 35. Id. at 43. 
 36. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1012 (1988). 
 37. Id. at 1015. 
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Festus asserts, “[i]t is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before 
the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend him-
self against the charges.”38 Frustratingly, Scalia fails—in either Crawford or Coy—to iden-
tify or engage with any meaningful principles which might be found within ancient law to 
further illuminate the American common law understanding of confrontation, let alone the 
cases at bar. 
 The Court’s facial analysis is, on the whole, disappointing in that much could be 
gleaned as to the fundamental principles animating the doctrine of confrontation in ancient 
law. Frank R. Herrmann and Brownlow M. Speer provide an excellent study of ancient 
and medieval approaches to confrontation, and note that, fundamentally, “Roman criminal 
procedure, like that of the United States, was accusatorial.”39 Despite the widely varying 
degrees of substantive and procedural justice during the Roman Republic and Empire, 
Herrmann and Speer’s research reveals that “Roman criminal procedure consistently de-
manded that defendants have the opportunity to be present at the proceedings against 
them,” which, combined with the requirement that the accuser be present in court to state 
the charge and produce evidence, forms what amounted to “the opportunity for a personal 
encounter with the accuser in court.”40 While there was apparently no concrete, specifi-
cally-elucidated right of confrontation guaranteed to citizens in the Roman Republic and 
Empire analogous to the provision made in the Sixth Amendment, the combination of these 
ancient criminal procedures amounted to something which bears stark resemblance to the 
American right of confrontation. Indeed, Hermann and Speer caution that the procedural 
patchwork in Roman criminal procedure described “does not, however, expressly state that 
the accuser and the accused must be present in court at the same time.”41 However, appar-
ently in response to this gap, a late fourth century imperial constitutio included the provi-
sion holding it “improper for whatever is said against an absent person, by him alone who 
is accusing, immediately to be considered as true, as if against one who is present and even 
convicted.”42 
The critical inquiry when discussing the Roman legal approach to confrontation is, 
with regard to the American jurisprudence of confrontation, what principles or values that 
gave life to confrontation in the ancient world truly apply to today? Moreover, besides 
origin, what weight and significance should these principles attach to modern American 
jurisprudence? It is clear that Scalia, and thereby the Court, suffered this same inquiry, but 
to little avail.43 Regardless of whether or not the Court saw much value in looking to an-
cient sources, it is clear in the lack of depth and attention paid to these sources—compared 
to what the Court devotes to early modern common law perspectives—that the Court ulti-
mately devotes little more than the most cursory acknowledgements of jurisprudential lin-
eage in Crawford.44 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 1015–16 (citing Acts 25:16). 
 39. Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the 
Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 484 (1994). 
 40. Id. at 485–86. 
 41. Id. at 487–88. 
 42. Id. at 488. 
 43. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004); Coy, 487 U.S. at 1012. 
 44. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.  
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B. The Continental Rift and Inquisitional Practices 
Though the Court devotes little attention to the role ancient sources play in the evo-
lution of confrontation in the common law, the split between practices which would be-
come the common law—later transplanted and independently developed in the United 
States—and general trial practices which proliferated on the continent is at the very heart 
of Scalia’s analysis. Scalia writes that besides the common law tradition, “England at times 
adopted elements of the civil-law practice” including instances where “[j]ustices of the 
peace or other officials examined suspects and witnesses before trial . . . [and] read in court 
in lieu of live testimony.”45 The Court cites to Marian reforms in legal practices which 
culminated in the “most notorious instances of civil-law examination,” the trial of Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh.46 Despite explicitly stating the existence of a fundamental disconnect between 
common law and continental forms of confrontation, the Court stops short of meaningfully 
analyzing differences which underlie the tensions between the two forms; indeed, Scalia 
stops short by acknowledging simply “[w]hatever the original purpose, however, [ex-parte 
examinations] came to be used as evidence in some cases.”47 
Notwithstanding the Court’s treatment of the question, it is critical to understand the 
nature and extent of divergence between the modes of criminal procedure—and their pro-
visions for confrontation—between England and the continent. Understanding the simi-
larities, differences, and potential compatibility, of civil law forms to an English common 
law model of trial practice is best explained by the divergent histories of these two forms, 
starting at the fall of the Roman Empire. As the dust from the fall of the Roman Empire 
began to settle, the thirteenth century began to define European jurisprudence “in the 
realms of both Church and State by an increasing emphasis on the detection and punish-
ment of crime.”48 
After his passing reference to the existence of confrontation in ancient jurisprudence, 
Scalia begins his historical analysis in earnest by making a seemingly innocuous, though 
simplistic statement: “English common law has long differed from continental civil law in 
regard to the manner in which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials;” where the 
“common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, . . . 
civil law condones examination in private by judicial officers.”49 Admittedly, the byword 
for the inquisitorial model was the confession: Hermann and Speer write that “[t]he conti-
nental jurisprudence of the late Middle Ages regard a defendant’s confession as the ‘queen 
of proofs’ (regina probationum) in criminal cases.”50 This maxim envisions images remi-
niscent of the Spanish Black Legend, and such seems to be fairly confirmed by Hermann 
and Speer in writing that “[t]orture, which the Roman law authorized, was the legally sanc-
tioned method of obtaining such a confession.”51 However, this impression, perhaps im-
plicitly enjoyed by Scalia writing for the Court in Crawford, is somewhat reductive and 
                                                 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 44. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 522. 
 49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 50. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 522.  
 51. Id. 
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unfairly characterizes comparisons between the common law and civil law models. Her-
mann and Speer develop a more complete—and nuanced—picture of the civil law inqui-
sition system as something less than “notorious.” 
From these facts, it might appear that inquisitional procedure dispensed entirely 
with in-court testimony of witnesses to prove a defendant’s guilt. In fact, however, 
this was not so. It is a remarkable paradox that in inquisitional proceedings, except 
in the special situation of the inquisition against heresy, the barbarity of torture 
coexisted with a careful observance of a defendant’s basic right to meet his accusers 
in court.52 
While “paradoxical,” this model appears to be something less than a “notorious” model 
described by the Court as imported by Queen Mary, particularly with regard to the element 
of confrontation in civil law system. This nuanced and historically complicated mode of 
investigation and prosecution can only be explained by the unique history that drove the 
development of the civil law model of confrontation, borne of the inquisition. 
Described as “a discrete procedure in the decretal legislation of a great lawyer-
pope,” Innocent III (1198–1216), the inquisition began as a procedural solution to what 
Raymonde Foreville in his Histoire des Conciles Oecumeniques characterizes as a Church 
stricken with internal corruption.53 The initial procedural responses implemented by Inno-
cent III were, as Hermann and Speer describe, too cumbersome and protective, and inef-
fective in that it relied upon the individual accuser to serve as the primary force in seeking 
punishment of the high-ranking clergy.54 In response, Innocent III provided updated pro-
cedures whereby the “inquisitio [was a] means by which his delegated judges could inves-
tigate the rumor (fama) of such misconduct.”55 Critically, Innocent III envisioned the in-
quisition as a civil, rather than criminal, procedure for the removal of clergy from their 
offices for misconduct; no criminal penalties seem to have been contemplated.56 Hermann 
and Speer theorize that the particular nature of the inquisition at its inception, the absence 
of any criminal penalties, or any repercussions other than removal from office, explain 
why “the Pope omitted any mention of a suspect’s right to be present at proceedings 
against him or to present a defense.”57 
What was essentially an internal administrative adjudicatory procedure with little 
safeguards for the defendant due to a correspondingly limited remedy, was fundamentally 
inadequate for the purposes of criminal litigation. The Bolognese canonist Vincentius His-
panus articulated this concern, devoting particular attention with regard to the lack of pro-
cedural guarantees.58 The concern that a civil law system of confrontation borne of its 
precursor inquisition was inapposite to proper confrontation, as Scalia articulated writing 
for the Court in Crawford, had already been voiced centuries before: 
Query, whether an inquisition can take place against a person who is absent, as is 
accepted by many canonists [magistri]. But I have learned through experience that 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 522–23. 
 53. Id. at 523. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 523. 
 56. Id. at 524. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
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this is pernicious. If he were present, he would prove that on such-and-such a day 
he was not present when it is said that he killed so-and-so, and he would prove that 
the fama had its origin from his enemies in his absence; and although I would make 
inquisition, I would still hear from him afterwards in his defenses.59 
These procedural concerns voiced by Hispanus would have been cold comfort to Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh, but were nevertheless profound in their effect on the continent: Innocent re-
sponded to the criticisms launched against the current model, and in decretal Inquisitionis 
negotium, the Pope directed that names and statements of accusing witnesses must be pro-
vided to an inquisitional defendant.60 Later, the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 rearticu-
lated these protections, and included the right of a defendant to be present, notice of 
charges, and the ability to present a defense.61 
As the procedural dynamics of inquisition evolved and responded to concerns, and 
as this procedure spread rapidly into secular law, neither the Pope nor the Lateran Council 
were able to address directly “the question of whether a defendant had the right actually 
to see the accusing witness.”62 The uncertainty as to defendant’s rights continued, even as 
medieval Europe began to recover from the Dark Ages in its attempt to redevelop the first 
comprehensive territorial law since the fall of the Roman Empire. The legislation of 
Fredrick II of Sicily is remarkable for being the first sort of “territorial code of law” in 
medieval Europe since the Empire.63 Notably, as this code fully embraced the inquisitional 
procedure, it contained many of the same protections provided by Innocent III and the 
Lateran Council, including provisions that ensured “the defendant would be furnished with 
the names and statements of the witnesses against him.”64 These protections nevertheless 
suffered the same deficiency as that suffered by the procedural guarantees added by Inno-
cent III and the Lateran Council in that “it did not provide that . . . witnesses could be 
physically produced before [the defendant].”65 
Hermann and Speer note the inquisitional procedure developed by Innocent III, the 
Lateran Council, and later secular governments like Sicily all “fail[ed] to address the re-
quirement of Justinian’s Novel 90 that the adverse witness be produced in court in the 
presence of the defendant.”66 This omission did not go without comment, however; the 
jurist Albertus Gandinus attacked the deficiency, focusing in on the distinction made by 
inquisition courts between criminal inquiries relating to a specific defendant of a general 
crime and the identity of the actor.67 Gandinus concludes that “where the inquisitor is in-
quiring about a crime in generali, and not about a specific suspect, he does not summon 
anyone to be present at the introduction of the witnesses.”68 Another complicating feature 
of the inquisition’s criminal procedure was the role torture played in the necessity of pro-
ducing witnesses against the defendant in the first place. Particularly, as Gandinus laments, 
                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 525. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 526. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 526–27. 
 65. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 527. 
 66. Id. at 528. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 530. 
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those special procedural innovations introduced for the benefit of a defendant might easily 
“have been evaded by the use of torture to obtain a confession from the defendant before 
any witnesses against him were produced.”69 Gandinus’s study, though enlightening, left 
the question open as to whether—even with the prevalence of torture as a means of elicit-
ing confessions—this effectively “nullified” the right of confrontation. 
Bartolus (Bartolo de Sassoferrato), “whose commentaries on the Roman laws were 
looked upon by courts, scholars, and practitioners of the time, and for almost two centuries 
thereafter, as definitive,” answered that question.70 In the fourteenth century, the inquisi-
tional model was not only subject to changes subsequent to the criticisms of commentators 
like Gandinus, but was also subject to analysis under growing scholarship of Roman law 
which had long been unavailable to courts, scholars, and practitioners since the fall of 
Rome and Europe’s tortured crawl out from under the Dark Ages.71 In the course of asking 
whether someone inculpated in a general inquisition (where confrontation was not re-
quired) could be subject to torture in order to obtain a confession regarding a specific 
crime, Bartolus wrote that the accused could not be tortured on “the ground that a defend-
ant cannot be prejudiced by the testimony of witnesses whom he has not yet had an oppor-
tunity to see.”72 Bartolus was not alone on his conclusion; “leading criminal law scholars 
of continental Europe over the next two centuries” including Angelus Aretinus (Angelo 
Gambiglioni) in his Tractatus de maleficiis (1438), and Hippolytus de Marsiliis in his 
Practica causarum criminalium (1528) followed his assertion. Nor was this perspective 
lost over the centuries; Hermann and Speer note the scholarship of Pierre Ayrault, writing 
fifteen years before the trial of Raleigh in his Ordre, formalitae et instruction judiciaire, 
which asserted the primary necessity of confrontation in terms anticipatory of the Sixth 
Amendment: 
And in truth it seems that it is natural and consequently common to all men that the 
accused be heard; and that the witnesses who are charging him to be brought before 
him, to sustain face to face the crime of which they are accusing him, in order that 
if he has something to say against them, he may say it; and that the witness may see 
and recognize the person about whom they are deposing.73 
These voices from the continent, as part of a chorus of scholarship placing significant 
weight in favor of confrontation, soundly refute the shallow historical approach relied 
upon by Scalia in defining the primary aims of the Confrontation Clause in his hunt for 
the chief evil. There is little sense that this is the civil law model, borne of inquisitional 
procedures, against which the Confrontation Clause is supposed to protect; Hermann and 
Speer’s survey of confrontation throughout the medieval and early modern periods indi-
cates a linear evolution towards a procedural provision like that of Roman and Byzantine 
law.74 
Admittedly, there was “one great exception to the requirement of production of ac-
cusing witnesses before a defendant,” under which “it became standard practice not to 
                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 530. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 530–31. 
 73. Id. at 541. 
 74. Id. at 512–15. 
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produce accusing witnesses before a defendant.”75 Of course, as they note, the word “in-
quisition” today “stands for the antithesis of fair accusatorial procedure.”76 This exception, 
however, belonged to the narrow realm of heresy. Where the models of procedure thus far 
discussed have applied as a civil Church procedure that was later transplanted into other 
polities’ civil and criminal procedure, this exception applied exclusively to Church prose-
cutions of heretical acts.77 It is ironic then, that terms long embraced by the common law 
of evidence, “confront” and “face-to-face,” were born as legal terms in the “repressive 
context” of Nicolas Eymeric’s Directorium inquisitorum.78 The Directorium, which de-
tails “the tricks and pressure tactics of inquisitors,” explicitly provides for the accused to 
be confronted (confrontari) with suspected false witnesses.79 Additionally, the Directo-
rium provides for cases where an inquisitor may wish to affront the resistant suspect “face 
to face” (facie ad faciem affrontare) with the witness.80 Thus, even the language of modern 
confrontation itself was the product of the continent’s ongoing procedural evolution. This 
suggests that, while the inquiry of confrontation conducted by Scalia and the Court appear 
to understand the question as one of common law, the inquiry is inevitably also one of 
civil law. 
Hermann and Speer chronicle the evolution of the inquisitional procedural model as 
a decidedly complicated one; a process itself subject to continuous criticism, revision, and 
further analysis as the Church and states within Europe began adopting this model for both 
civil and criminal proceedings. This survey of procedural development on the continent 
with regard to confrontation suggests particular inadequacies in Scalia’s characterization 
of the inquisition’s procedural progeny, the civil law system. Primarily, the overly-gener-
alized characterizations of the civil law system should not be taken for granted as it is 
articulated in Crawford. In Crawford, Scalia’s historical narrative tracking the evolution 
of confrontation in the common law dedicates particular attention to the infamous trial of 
Sir Walter Raleigh, where Scalia quotes Raleigh’s protestations that he was being tried by 
the Spanish Inquisition.81 From there, Scalia writes of the various judicial and statutory 
responses to “limit these abuses.”82 However, as Hermann and Speer detail, the inquisito-
rial model does not readily yield to Scalia’s portrait of a civil law system as such by courts 
at the time of Raleigh’s trial. Moreover, the story of confrontation, while by no means 
devoid of common law influences, is one that must necessarily be also told from a conti-
nental perspective. 
Further discussion of the English common law’s medieval and early modern trial 
procedure shows that the statutory and judicial responses to Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial is 
perhaps better described as yet another step in an evolutionary process which began on the 
continent, rather than the forceful rejection of infamous and foreign practices. However 
one approaches the concept of confrontation, what can be said with considerable certainty 
is that Scalia’s assertion that “English common law has long differed from continental 
                                                 
 75. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 535. 
 76. Id. at 522.  
 77. Id. at 535. 
 78. Id. at 535–36. 
 79. Id. at 535. 
 80. Hermann & Speer, supra note 39, at 536. 
 81. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). 
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civil law in regard to the manner in which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials” is 
only accurate in a sense far away from the one implied.83 Still, better illuminations as to 
the procedures utilized in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh and the judicial and statutory 
responses that followed should be found in examining the English common law. 
III. THE COMMON LAW: VARIANCE AND CONTINUITY IN CONFRONTATION 
The touchstone of the Court’s analysis in Crawford began with a distinction: “Eng-
lish common law has long differed from continental civil law in regard to the manner in 
which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials.”84 Scalia writes that where the common 
law’s “tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing . . . the civil 
law condones examination in private by judicial officers.”85 The scholarship of Hermann 
and Speer makes it clear that Scalia wrote for the Court in Crawford with an undue degree 
of generality in his characterization of the civil law system. More problematic, however, 
is the degree of generality Scalia affords to characterizing the English common law of 
confrontation. Scalia begins by writing that “[t]he founding generation’s immediate source 
of the concept [of confrontation] was the common law,” and the primary definition of the 
English common law provided by Scalia being that “English common law has long dif-
fered from continental civil law in regard to the manner in which witnesses give testimony 
in criminal trials.”86 This circular and reductive definition is not helped much by the further 
characterization that “[t]he common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject 
to adversarial testing, while the civil law condones examination in private judicial offic-
ers.”87 To support this assertion, Scalia cites to a specific passage from William Black-
stone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, particularly his description of cross exam-
ination.88 This source, written 165 years after the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, bears 
consideration: 
There are a few of the advantages attending this [cross examination], the English, 
way of giving testimony, ore tenus. Which was also indeed familiar among the an-
cient Romans, as may be collected from Quintillian; who lays down very good in-
structions for examining and cross-examining witnesses viva voce. And this, or 
somewhat like it, was continued as low as the time of Hadrian: but the civil law, as 
it is now modeled, rejects all public examination of witnesses.89 
In reality, modern scholarship has proven the common law features of confrontation 
and cross examination are not as timeless, nor as monolithic, as Blackstone or Scalia pro-
pose it to be. It must also be remembered in this discussion that, as Wigmore notes, there 
was never “an indispensable thing called Confrontation as distinguished from Cross-ex-
amination.”90 While the two concepts are distinct, they are nevertheless inextricably inter-
twined since “[t]here was a right to cross-examination as indispensable, and that right was 
                                                 
 83. Id. at 43. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373–74 (1768) (cited in Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 43). 
 89. Id. at 373–74. 
 90. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1397, at 100. 
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involved in and secured by confrontation.”91 Discussion of confrontation often cannot be 
disconnected from the concept of cross examination, and consideration by both early mod-
ern and modern scholars bears this out. With that in mind, whether the Court’s understand-
ing of the common law’s approach to confrontation stands as unduly general as its treat-
ment of the continental tradition bears further investigation. 
Writing on the subject of process and examination in late medieval and early Tudor 
criminal law, John Bellamy writes “[e]xamination and the truncation of judicial procedure 
often approached close to doing justice summarily.”92 Under the reigns of Henry V and 
Henry VI, statutes regulating the wages of servants and laborers gave justices of the peace 
“power to examine these employees, and also their master, on oath so as to discover if and 
how they had broken the statutes of 1349 and 1351.”93 While this constitutes the first in-
stance of witnesses being examined on oath in England, the question as to whether these 
statements might have been offered directly into evidence is unclear.94 However, by 1433, 
it is clear that justices of the peace were given power to inquire by examination, search, 
and punish on the basis of these examinations while investigating particular business prac-
tices.95 
Bellamy takes care to note that the regulations which entailed these procedures of 
examination on oath “were only [a] minor part of the criminal law legislation of the period” 
all of which “had a close connection with the master-servant relationship and were partic-
ularly difficult to conceal once committed.”96 That being said, whatever the uniqueness of 
the exact legislative objectives, these forms of examination and summary adjudication by 
justices of the peace reached new heights in popularity in the reign of Henry VII.97 Under 
his reign: 
No fewer than ten statutes made use of these procedures: in four statutes examina-
tion was merely an alternative to presentment or indictment, in one it took their 
place, in five it served as an alternative to trial by petty jury and in three it replaced 
such a trial entirely.98 
Statutes of this sort which introduced similar procedures into new areas of criminal law 
were scant under the reign of Henry VIII, but Bellamy suggests that these provisions “had 
already been established in all the most profitable areas during the reign of the previous 
king.”99 Indeed, just as the inquisition on the continent led to the further development of 
secular criminal procedure, the Henrician Reformation led to important developments in 
procedure in the Church’s struggle to enforce conformity to Anglican practices. 
Under the reign of Henry VIII, there was what Bellamy refers to as a “most distinct” 
shift in the history of witnesses, one which “was not a period when the criminal side of the 
common law developed according to its own principles and logic unmolested.”100 Much 
                                                 
 91. Id.  
 92. JOHN G. BELLAMY, CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND TUDOR ENGLAND 8 (1984). 
 93. Id. at 12. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 13. 
 96. Id. at 15. 
 97. BELLAMY, supra note 92, at 15. 
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 99. Id. at 22. 
 100. Id. at 37. 
13
Young: Confronting Crawford: Judicial Historiography and the Sixth Amend
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2017
134 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:121] 
like on the continent, Bellamy describes the “strong pressures from outside and the pre-
vailing influence was undoubtedly that of the ecclesiastical law.”101 These influences were 
manifested in relevant statues which were concerned with ecclesiastical matters, of which 
the government had a direct interest due to the heightened security concerns after Eng-
land’s break with Rome.102 These statutes established procedures that were administered 
by both the secular and ecclesiastical authorities, but the procedures themselves were a 
mix of traditional and novel practices. Two of these statutes left bishops the task of finding 
two witnesses, and both of these statutes stipulated for charges to “be obtained by present-
ment of twelve men in the common law fashion.”103 In contrast, in statutes charged with 
combating the production of prohibited books, charges were brought upon the accusation 
of a private individual, and trial included witnesses from both the accusers and the accused 
before “either two members of the king’s council or the ordinary in conjunction with two 
justices of the peace.”104 It is clear, therefore, that the ecclesiastical interests in enforcing 
conformity through modified procedures was unique to the inquisitions on the continent. 
The criminal statutes under the reign of Henry VIII bear out a struggle over who 
administrated the procedures under the English Reformation rather than the procedures 
themselves; the differences in procedure that attended secular and ecclesiastical admin-
istration of these statutes were attendant factors rather than primary considerations in the 
eventual shift to common law in criminal proceedings.105 Accusation by witness, even by 
two or more witnesses, “was no longer acceptable in 1544, whereas ten years earlier it 
ha[d] been introduced into the new heresy act . . . as a precaution against the preemptory 
seizure and examination of a heresy suspect . . . without proper process.”106 Bellamy cau-
tions that the shift towards common law rather than ecclesiastical administration “may 
well have been promoted as much by popular resentment at the latter as by the govern-
ment’s belief in the judicial efficacy of the former.”107 The most striking innovation of 
these statutory procedures was the allowance for the accused to prove their innocence by 
producing more witnesses than those who were produced against him to indicate their in-
nocence, but the innovation itself evinces its novel origins in the English break with Rome. 
None of this is to say that the Court’s analysis, evinced by Scalia’s opinion, was 
wholly reductive. Scalia’s statements that “England at times adopted element of civil-law 
practice” and that examinations by justices of the peace “were sometimes read in court in 
lieu of live testimony” might be construed as a concession regarding the imperfections of 
English common law rather than some assertion of invasive continental practices.108 More-
over, the Court supplies ample reference to case law that undermines the generalized dis-
tinctions manufactured by Scalia in the opinion, noting cases from 1603, 1554, 1329, and 
1637 respectively.109 This balanced analysis breaks down, however, when Scalia shifts 
                                                 
 101. Id. 
 102. BELLAMY, supra note 92, at 37. 
 103. Id. at 38. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 37–40. 
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attention to statutes under Queen Mary that permitted pretrial examination.110 It is from 
these Marian bail and committal statutes and the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh that the Court 
extrapolates the “notorious instances of civil-law examination,” forming the principal evil 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed against.111 However, Bellamy’s study of 
these bail and committal statutes indicates anything but a break with tradition. 
Analysis of the Marian bail and committal statutes is only productive insofar as they 
are understood in context of the existing statutory scheme established and developed be-
fore. Bellamy writes, “[t]he statues utilizing witnesses for the purpose of giving evidence 
and proving guilt passed since the beginning of the Reformation Parliament had in general 
dealt with offenses which were being put into the statute book for the first time.”112 More-
over, the “vast majority of serious crimes were unaffected” by Henrician legal reforms 
after the break with Rome.113 So, if statutes using witnesses for the purposes of giving 
evidence rather than requisites for summary adjudication by the justices of the peace were 
relative to the novelty of the offense they were meant to adjudicate; the question is to what 
degree—if any—these statutes depart from previous statutory standards. This, if any-
where, may serve to usefully establish the procedural baseline against whatever potential 
departures the Marian bail and committal statutes might be compared. 
Bellamy writes, “[t]hat the ‘committal’ statute of 1555 borrowed procedural details 
from previous acts seems quite clear.”114 Suggesting that the procedures of the committal 
statutes were not commonly used before 1555 is difficult, since Lord Chancellor Thomas 
More admits that in crimes of felony and treason the same procedure of examining the 
accused and taking information from the accusers were a matter of course.115 Moreover, a 
similar certification procedure, by which the justices of the peace would produce evidence 
in the form of examinations of the accused, the apprehenders, and witnesses were prevalent 
in statutes before Queen Mary.116 
In light of the Court’s preoccupation with the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, particular 
attention should be devoted to the role previous statutory provisions under the law of trea-
son played in the committal statute. Three acts before the 1555 statute, but since 1547, set 
forth definition and parameters regarding the role of witnesses in cases of treason.117 Ad-
mittedly, these statutes do not contain material pertaining to the taking of examinations 
from the accused, apprehenders, or accusers, but simply state that witnesses were neces-
sary for the indictment and arraignment of the accused.118 The first act of treason under 
Edward VI provided that no one could be indicted, arraigned, or convicted for high treason 
unless accused by two “sufficient, lawful, and willing witnesses.”119 The second act under 
Edward VI is somewhat more complicated, requiring two “accusers” to be in attendance 
at the indictment, arraignment, and conviction portions of the trial; additionally, if alive, 
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they “should appear in person before the accused” to affirm the charges in the indict-
ment.120 The third act, notably under Philip and Mary, provided that the accused had a 
right to have at least two witnesses who had confessed or deposed against them.121 Bellamy 
cautions, however, against weighing too much significance to these requirements; Bellamy 
writes that “[t]here was, however, no suggestion in this act that these witnesses were nec-
essary adjuncts at the indictment.”122 In fact, “no statute treats the issue of whether wit-
nesses had to be present at felony trials,” but since they were required to be at certain 
portions of the trials, they “must surely have been available for both indictment and ar-
raignment, which usually occurred on the same day.”123 
Scalia makes reference to the trials of Throckmorton and Lilburn as examples where 
examinations where read into court in lieu of live testimony, one of those forays where 
“England at times adopted elements of the civil-law practice.”124 This characterization is 
problematic, as these cases, in addition to the trial of William Thomas, were creatures of 
earlier statutory provisions, and were in fact influencers of the committal statutes.125 Bel-
lamy, writing on these treason trials, observed that “[t]here [were] . . . no references to the 
recording of evidence by the examiners, or binding over of witnesses or certifying of rel-
evant material for use of the prosecution” but that “clearly the subject of witnesses, . . . 
their depositions or lack of them, their appearance in court, and the validity of their testi-
mony, were all matters of concern.”126 Responsive to these cases, it appears that the Marian 
statutes were “keeping in step with similar [earlier] provisions existing in regard to trea-
son.”127 Rather than standing as a turn against tradition as presupposed by the Court in 
Crawford, it appears that these statutes were part of a continuing evolution of confronta-
tion in English criminal procedure. Whatever may be meaningfully gleaned from the trial 
of Sir Walter Raleigh, the statutory history of English criminal procedure—especially 
placed alongside its continental equivalents—envisages something less than an intrusion 
of civil law practices, but rather the continuation of a statutory scheme long accepted in 
English common law. 
IV. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND CONFRONTATION ANALYSIS 
Resting upon his appraisal of confrontation in the ancient world, civil law, and Eng-
lish common law histories, Scalia glances over practices in the Colonies and early state 
decisions regarding confrontation.128 According to Scalia, writing for the Court, “[t]his 
history supports two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”129 Primarily, 
“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode 
of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against 
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the accused.”130 The coordinate conclusion, based upon the historiography articulated by 
Scalia, stands in direct opposition to Wigmore’s position that “witnesses against” means 
those whose statements are offered at trial: “Accordingly, we once again reject the view 
that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony, and that 
its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon ‘the law of Ev-
idence for the time being.’”131 It is telling that these conclusions are immediately but-
tressed in the text by hearkening back to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, arguing “the reg-
ulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation 
Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”132 
Despite his assertion that Wigmore’s model would “render the Confrontation Clause 
powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices,” Scalia devotes pre-
cious little attention to the analysis that underlies Wigmore’s assertion.133 However, it 
bears noting the considerable historical and analytical force Wigmore provides to support 
the proposition that “witnesses against” means those whose statements are offered at trial. 
Wigmore asserts, uncontroversially, that “almost all Constitutions have given a permanent 
sanction to the principle of confrontation, by provisions requiring that in criminal cases 
the accused shall be ‘confronted with the witnesses against him’ or ‘brought face to face’ 
with them.”134 The real question, according to Wigmore, is “whether these constitutional 
provisions affect the common-law requirement of confrontation, otherwise by putting it 
beyond the possibility of abolition by an ordinary legislative body.”135 Underlying this 
question, though, is Wigmore’s concern that “[t]he main and essential purpose of confron-
tation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.”136 Not only does 
this assertion comply with the historical evidence discussed supra, but Wigmore provides 
substantial English and American decisional law to support this; from Chief Justice Hale 
in 1680 commenting upon the 1552 statute of Edward VI, and other English cases from 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, to a series of American cases through-
out the nineteenth century, all of which endorse exactly this perspective.137 Ancient, me-
dieval, early modern, and modern treatments of confrontation appear to support Wig-
more’s observation that the functional purpose of a “witness against” necessarily means 
those whose statements are offered at trial, subject to cross examination. 
Nevertheless, coming to terms with the intersection of hearsay and confrontation 
does not conclusively resolve this analysis. Addressing the seemingly absolute language 
of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, Wigmore begins by reasserting the in-
extricable intertwinement of confrontation and cross-examination: 
There never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing 
called Confrontation as distinguished from Cross-examination. There was a right 
to cross-examination as indispensable, and that right was involved in and secured 
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by confrontation; it was the same right under different names.138 
Wigmore observed that, historically, the “right of cross-examination thus secured 
was not a right devoid of exceptions.”139 Wigmore draws the third element of this near-
Trinitarian approach into analysis: “The right to subject opposing testimony to cross-ex-
amination is the right to have the Hearsay rule enforced; for the Hearsay rule is the rule 
requiring cross-examination.”140 Critically, the hearsay rule is not a rule without excep-
tions, and, as Wigmore observes, there never was a time when it was without them.141 The 
Court, as Scalia writes, acknowledges these existing exceptions, but articulates the com-
mon law of hearsay and confrontation as having been frozen in time at the time of found-
ing: the Sixth Amendment “is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confronta-
tion at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the 
founding.”142 However, these rules are not, as Scalia articulates them, frozen into a static 
view of common law at the time of the founding of the nation according to Wigmore, but 
rather something of a constantly-developing dialectic. Wigmore explains: “The rule had 
always involved the idea of exceptions, and the constitution-makers indorsed the general 
principle merely as such. They did not care to enumerate exceptions; they merely named 
and described the principle sufficiently to indicate what was intended.”143 
None of this is to say that any of Scalia’s observations are actually incorrect. Rather, 
they indicate an approach that has not fully embraced the complexity and nuance of the 
history of confrontation throughout history. Scalia’s analysis in Crawford leads to an ap-
proximate conclusion similar to that summarized by Wigmore. Where Scalia determined 
that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law 
mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examination as evidence 
against the accused,” Wigmore’s analysis leads to the conceit that “the net result, then, 
under the constitutional rule, is that, so far as testimony is required under the Hearsay rule 
to be taken infra-judicially, it shall be taken in a certain way, namely subject to cross-
examination—not secretly or ‘ex parte’ away from the accused.”144 Despite what appears 
to be the conceptual equivalent of harmless errors, the critical divergence between these 
formidable jurists as to the question of confrontation lies in a more fundamental divergence 
in historical analysis and jurisprudence. Where there is only “the principal evil” in Scalia’s 
analysis, which leads to a testimonial/non-testimonial dichotomy, Wigmore provides for 
an adaptable analysis: 
The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying 
declarations, or the like) shall be given infra-judicially—this depends on the law of 
Evidence for the time being—but only what mode of procedure shall be followed—
i.e., a cross-examining procedure—in the case of such testimony as is required by 
the ordinary law of Evidence to be given infra-judicially.145 
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Simply put, Wigmore’s approach stands for the principle that Confrontation “sanctioned 
by the Constitution is the Hearsay rule as to cross-examination, with all the exceptions that 
may legitimately be found, developed, or created therein.”146 In the sharpest contrast, Jus-
tice Scalia’s historiography—and thereby his Constitutional approach—rests on a static 
view of both the common law and the historical forces which animated the rationale for 
the rule. 
Poignantly, the Court’s flat rejection of using the law of evidence as the baseline for 
Confrontation Clause analysis is exactly what Wigmore counseled against. Wigmore as-
serted that “[t]he revision and extension of those exceptions is gradually progressing, and 
it is well to appreciate fully that there is in this progress nothing inconsistent with consti-
tutional sanctions.”147 Upon this statement rests a powerful policy argument, one which 
appears to have been vindicated by the confused and indeterminate results of Williams v. 
Illinois: “It is well to have the sound theory fully understood and accepted, because, if the 
other should temporarily prevail, its overthrow and the exposure of its fallacies might be 
thought to involve the overthrow of the exceptions to the Hearsay rule.”148 
V. CONCLUSION 
Writing for the Court, Scalia generates a testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy; but 
the historiography that undergirds the analysis generating this framework—as this Com-
ment has shown—inadequately comprehends the historical factors which animate this 
analysis. Scalia, in an attempt to freeze the federal constitutional law of confrontation, and 
thereby identify the chief evils sought to be protected against, developed static and reduc-
tive constructions of both the early modern civil law and the English common law. The 
cursory historical survey of ancient and early modern sources within this Comment belies 
the historical conclusions generated by Scalia, and therefore it quickly becomes clear that 
the Court in Crawford came to an arguably correct conclusion on an analytical framework 
based upon faulty historiography. The complex, inconsistent, and conflicting progeny of 
Crawford, namely Williams v. Illinois, serves as a warning against those sorts of jurispru-
dence which seek to assail the chief evils determined through an approach to history that 
views legal traditions as static and without adequate detail. Until the Court chooses to 
reexamine the question of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, unchained from 
this inadequate historical analysis, confrontation will remain constrained by this faulty 
framework. 
–Randall Young 
                                                 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 104. 
  148.   Id. 
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